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Throughout the history of the church, theories of atonement have rarely been discussed with 
other-than-human creatures in mind. This is surprising, given the emphasis in some New 
Testament texts on the cosmic scope of the reconciliation effected in Jesus Christ. The first 
chapter of Colossians affirms that in Christ, God ‘was pleased to reconcile all things (ta 
panta), whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross’ (v. 
20). Ephesians has a similarly broad view of the work of Christ, picturing ‘all things’ in 
heaven and earth being gathered up in in him (1.10). We seem, therefore, to be in need of an 
explanation of this lacuna in traditions of Christian atonement doctrine. Such an explanation 
does not seem to be far away: other New Testament texts state that Jesus Christ was ‘the 
atoning sacrifice for our sins’ (1 Jn. 2.2), ‘handed over handed over to death for our 
trespasses’ and ‘raised for our justification’ (Rom. 4.25). If these latter texts are correct and 
Jesus died for sins and trespasses, it seems to make little sense to say that he makes peace 
between things for which sins and trespasses have no relevance. Following this logic, 
theologians seem to have preferred to understand the Colossian and Ephesian ‘all things’ as 
hyperbolic, and to construe atonement as a human-specific event. There are reasons to think, 
however, that this settlement is unsatisfactory. In this essay, therefore, I will explore options 
for a more expansive view that attends more closely to the cosmic vision of Colossians and 
Ephesians. 
 Andrew Linzey suggests that there are three options for orthodox Christian belief in 
relation to non-human animals and the atonement: (1) ‘animals are not capable of sin or 
estrangement and therefore are not able to be included in the saving work of Christ’; (2) ‘if 
they have sinned or fallen from grace it may be possible for the Son of God to become 
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incarnate in their nature to in order to reconcile them’ (Linzey, 99); (3)  ‘by becoming 
incarnate in one rational species,  
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the Son of God has ipso facto become the redeemer of all’ (Mascall, 107). If the first option 
or second option is correct, either non-human animals are not sinful or estranged and are not 
therefore in need of reconciliation, or they need a non-human incarnation for redemption. In 
either case, theories of atonement that treat humans exclusively are well-formulated: 
atonement is human-specific because the problem to which it responds is human-specific. 
Only if the third option is correct, that God’s reconciling work in Jesus Christ is redemptive 
of all creatures, as the Christologies of Colossians and Ephesians suggest, do we need to 
rethink human-centred atonement theories. 
 One objection to the third option of extending the concept of atonement through the 
work of Jesus Christ to non-human creatures is that it is implausible to think that non-human 
creatures stand in need reconciliation. There are a range of ways of approaching this 
question, however, that indicate we need to think more broadly about the creatures for whom 
reconciliation is relevant. For example, the partners in the Genesis 9 covenant are repeatedly 
identified as Noah, his descendants, and ‘every living creature’ of ‘all flesh’ (vv. 10, 12, 15, 
16, 17), and the later division between clean and unclean animals can plausibly be interpreted 
as between those that kept the covenant by eating the green plants specified for them in 
Genesis 1:30, and those that did not (Grumett and Muers, 73; Clough, 54-5). Transgressing or 
forgetting God’s covenant representing the original ordering of things therefore seem modes 
of sin that are clearly applicable beyond the human realm. The covenant in Hosea also 
addresses non-human animals (Hos. 2.18). The judgement of God proclaimed by the prophets 
often falls humans and other animals together, in Jeremiah (7.20; 14.6; 21.6; 12.4), Ezekiel 
(14.13–21; 38.19–20), Joel (1.4–20; 2.4–7), Zephaniah (1.2–3), and Haggai (1.11). When 
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Jonah prophesies to Nineveh, the all humans and other animals fast and cover themselves 
with sackcloth (Jon. 3.7–8) and when God forgives Nineveh, God refers to non-human 
animals as well as humans to explain the decision to Jonah (Jon. 4.11). There is therefore a 
broad biblical basis for thinking of the need for reconciliation going beyond the human 
sphere. 
 Another reason to judge that human beings are unique in their need for reconciliation is 
that many other attributes formerly considered uniquely human have been shown in studies of 
non-human animals to be more broadly shared. Crows have been observed to fashion tools to 
solve problems; chimpanzees are capable of empathy, morality, and politics, and of outdoing 
humans in numerically based memory tests; dolphins interpret grammar; parrots understand 
abstract properties such of objects such as colour and shape; whales show cultural specificity 
in their behaviour and communication (see discussion in Clough, On Animals I, 29–30 
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 and 64–76).  Given the overlap of many of these capacities with what we have understood as 
rationality, it is very difficult to advance a definition of rationality that distinguishes between 
human and non-human animals. Given this new knowledge of non-human animal capacities, 
it is unclear how we could retain a concept of wrong-doing and a consequent need for 
reconciliation that did not overlap in some way with at least some non-human animals. This 
general point is supported by specific examples, such as the account Jane Goodall gives of a 
history of the stealing and eating of infant chimpanzees by a particular female and her family, 
and the opposition and disgust manifested by other members of the troop (Goodall, 193-5, 
206-7; Clough, 112-15). 
 While I judge that there is no good theological reason to restrict language of sin to 
human beings (Clough, 105–119), it may be that Linzey’s reference to ‘estrangement’ in his 
options noted above provide a category of creatures in need of reconciliation that is broader 
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than sinfulness. Estrangement is more than innocent suffering. It is clear that both human and 
other-than-human creatures suffer as a result of sinful human cruelty, but such innocent 
victims are not thereby estranged from God. They require redemption from their suffering, 
certainly, but not reconciliation. Other creatures, however, could be seen in a different 
category. For example, Luther judges that the natures of non-human animals were changed 
by human sin to make some of them vicious and threatening (Luther, vol. 1, 76-7; vol. 2, 74). 
If this were the case, then wolves and lions, ordered originally to eat only green plants (Gen. 
1.30), have, as a result of the Fall, departed from the way God set for them and become 
dependent on killing other creatures for their food. We might not in this case wish to say that 
wolves or lions sin in killing for food, but we might say that in this way of life they have 
become estranged from the God who wished them to live in peace. Wolves and lions might 
then be judged not as sinful, but as estranged, and so in need of reconciliation in order to 
participate in the renewed peaceable creaturely relations prophesied by Isaiah (Is. 11.1–9; 
65.25). 
 This consideration of the question of whether non-human animals could be considered 
sinful, or estranged, from God suggests that Linzey’s first option—that only humans require 
reconciliation—is not an attractive one. Sin and estrangement from God spills out beyond the 
human realm, and therefore humans are not the only creatures in need of reconciliation by 
God. The recognition of such sin or estrangement in non-human creatures is compatible with 
the second option Linzey presents, that in Jesus Christ God acted to bring reconciliation to 
human beings, and reconciliation of non-human species would require God to assume their 
nature in other incarnations. This is an unattractive 
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prospect, however, for a number of reasons. First, it is as strongly at odds with the ‘all things’ 
Christological visions of Colossians and Ephesians as the first option that denies the 
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relevance of reconciliation to non-human creatures. On this account, Jesus Christ reconciles 
only one kind of thing, and some other saviour is required for the rest. Second, replacing one 
cosmic incarnation with millions of species-specific ones seems unattractive in its 
complexity, and difficult conceptually, since species change over time, boundaries between 
them are fluid, and definitions of the boundaries between species are contested among 
biologists (Wilkins). The second option of God reconciling non-human creatures through a 
multitude of species-specific incarnations, therefore, does not commend itself.  
 While most of this discussion has been in terms of whether atonement and 
reconciliation relates to non-human animals in addition to human ones, it is important to take 
one step further and ask whether reconciliation is even more broadly applicable, to all 
creatures of God, the whole of creation. The Christological visions of Ephesians and 
Colossians so emphatically specify ‘all things’, that there seems little justification for 
confining this work of God to animal creatures. The lack of a clear demarcation between 
animal and non-animal life — sponges and slime moulds are borderline cases — is an 
additional reason not to put significant theological weight on this boundary line. If ‘all things’ 
are reconciled in Jesus Christ, we are better off thinking through atonement as God’s 
reconciliation through Jesus Christ of an estranged creation, including creatures that are 
human animals, non-human animals, other living creatures such as plants and bacteria, and 
non-living creatures, such as rivers, rocks and stars. Only such a broad vision can do justice 
to these comprehensive and cosmic visions of God’s work in Jesus Christ; to attempt to 
delimit the action of God to any subset of creatures seems very likely to encounter problems 
parallel to those we have discussed in relation to non-human animals. Clearly, creatures such 
as mountains and oceans are not in need of forgiveness of the kind of deliberate acts of 
rebellion that characterize the need of some humans for reconciliation, but rock falls and 
tsunamis remind us that these inanimate creatures are not always at peace with plant and 
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animal life, and therefore that the peacemaking between all things effected in Jesus Christ 
(Col. 1.20) is needed even here. 
 Extending the reach of the doctrine of the atonement in this way raises a range of other 
doctrinal questions. If other-than-human creatures are estranged from God, as suggested 
above, we must reckon with a more-than-human doctrine of the Fall, rather than alternative 
options either that retain its application to humans alone, or discard it entirely (Clough, 122–
127. If Christ’s  
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reconciling work relates to those elected by God, then there are implications for the doctrine 
of election as well (Clough, chapter 4). If reconciliation leads to redemption, we should give 
consideration to more-than-human visions of the new creation and the creaturely relations 
that operate there (Clough, chapters 6-7). The theological reappraisals demanded within these 
other doctrinal loci illustrate the broad scope of fruitful theological questions provoked by 
attending to other-than-human animals in relation to the atonement. The alternative course of 
retaining a human-only account of atonement seems, in contrast, to represent an oddly 
constricted and over-modest vision of the atoning work of Jesus Christ. 
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